

**Steering the Algerian Liberation Revolution (1956–1962): A Comparative Analytical Study
of the Coordination and Execution Committee’s Role**

Dr. Guerraoui Nadia, Lecturer A

Saida University – Dr. Tahar Moulay, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Department of
Human Sciences ALGERIA

Email: nadia.guerraoui@univ-saida.dz

Received: 05-12-2025

Accepted: 10-04-2026

Published:04-05-2026

Abstract

The Algerian War of Liberation (1954–1962) is considered one of the greatest national liberation movements of the twentieth century, not only because of the political and military victory it achieved, but also because of the distinguished organizational and institutional experience it produced, which enabled it to endure and continue in the face of a harsh colonial system. In this context, the Coordination and Execution Committee emerged as one of the most important leadership bodies that played a central role in managing and implementing the decisions of the National Liberation Front, as it functioned as the executive body responsible for applying and enforcing the decisions of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, within an integrated relationship aimed at unifying leadership and organizing revolutionary work both politically and militarily.

These two institutions emerged following the Soummam Conference (20 August 1956), which constituted a decisive turning point in the course of the revolution. It was held nearly two years after the outbreak of the revolution and served as an evaluative and organizational conference that responded to the requirements of the stage, seeking to overcome fragmentation, regulate structures, establish the principle of collective leadership, and create a relative separation between political and military tasks. From this perspective, the Coordination and Execution Committee represented a practical tool for translating the conference resolutions, both inside and outside the country, despite the obstacles and multiple difficulties it faced, including internal disagreements, the pressures of clandestine work, and the challenges posed by French colonial strategies against the liberation revolution. Nevertheless, it played a significant role during the Algerian Revolution.

The study concludes that the Coordination and Execution Committee, despite its short duration and the difficulties it encountered, represented a pioneering organizational and institutional experience that enabled the revolution to continue in the face of the French colonial system.

Keywords: Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE); Algerian Revolution; Soummam Conference; National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA); National Liberation Front.

Introduction

The Algerian National Liberation Revolution (1954–1962) is considered one of the greatest national liberation movements of the twentieth century, not only for its political and military victories but also for the organizational and institutional experience it produced, which enabled it to endure and persist in the face of a harsh and repressive colonial regime. In this context, the Coordination and Execution Committee emerged as one of the most important leadership bodies, playing a pivotal role in managing and implementing the decisions of the National Liberation Front (FLN), as it functioned as the executive apparatus responsible for applying and executing the resolutions of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, within an integrated framework aimed at unifying leadership and organizing the revolutionary effort both politically and militarily.

These two institutions arose following the Soumam Conference (20 August 1956), which marked a turning point in the course of the revolution. Coming nearly two years after the outbreak of the revolution, the conference served as both an evaluative and organizational meeting, responding to the necessities of the period. It sought to overcome fragmentation, regulate structures, consolidate the principle of collective leadership, and establish a relative separation between political and military tasks. From this perspective, the Coordination and Execution Committee served as a practical tool to implement the conference's decisions, both domestically and abroad, despite facing multiple obstacles and challenges, including internal disagreements, the pressures of clandestine work, and the strategic pressures imposed by the French colonial authorities against the revolution.

The importance of studying the Coordination and Execution Committee stems from its reflection of the organizational, political, and military awareness of the Algerian revolutionary leadership. It also provides a deeper understanding of how the liberation struggle was managed, the mechanisms of decision-making, and the interaction among revolutionary institutions. Accordingly, this study raises the following research question: To what extent did the Coordination and Execution Committee succeed in fulfilling its executive role after the Soumam Conference, and how did it contribute to organizing the course of the Algerian revolution while addressing internal and external challenges?

To answer this question, this article adopts a comparative analytical approach, analyzing the role of the Coordination and Execution Committee in the course of the liberation revolution and linking it to the historical context and the events that occurred from the Soumam Conference to the establishment of the Cairo Conference and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, thereby highlighting its true significance in the institutional development of the Algerian revolutionary movement.

1- Tasks of the First Coordination and Execution Committee (1956–1957)

This committee was entrusted with missions that bore the responsibility of achieving those objectives. It had the authority to convene the National Council of the Revolution and to present before it, in regular or extraordinary sessions, a complete report on its activities. At the same time, it derived its mandate from the Council whenever the need arose to undertake certain initiatives. It also oversaw the implementation of all decisions and recommendations issued by the National Council of the Revolution.

In addition, the committee was responsible for monitoring all political, military, economic, and social activities related to the Revolution, both internally and externally.

It also studied the granting of military ranks and supervised all political, propaganda, economic, and even labor committees, which the Conference had recommended establishing. These committees were tasked with implementing the decisions of the Soumam Conference and ensuring the protection of the interests of the people and the revolution.

As for the administration of rural areas, this task was entrusted to councils elected by the people. Each council consisted of five members headed by a president whose role was to oversee public order, judicial and Islamic affairs, as well as financial, economic, and even police matters (Harbi M. , 1983).

Thus, thanks to the resolutions of the Soumam Conference, the Revolution was organized through its political and organizational institutions. The Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE) continuously sought to fulfill its duties and implement its missions to the fullest extent possible, despite the obstacles and difficulties it encountered.

At this point, it is appropriate to ask: What was the nature of these obstacles? And to what extent did they lead the committee to a dead end? All of this will be examined and analyzed in the following section through the stance of the external delegation toward the policy of the CCE.

The Position of the External Delegation Regarding the Policy of the Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE):

After the Soumam Conference was held and its resolutions were established, *Abane Ramdane* sent a strongly worded letter to the external delegation, which was received by *Ben Bella* through *Ait Ahmed*. In it, he demanded the implementation of the Soumam Conference decisions and objected to the legitimacy of the Coordination and Execution Committee.

In this letter, Abane Ramdane urged the external delegation to focus on the Algerian cause instead of wasting time trying to convince Tunisia and Morocco to join the struggle. Regarding Algerian-Egyptian relations, he asserted that Egypt was exploiting the Algerian issue to achieve its own goals. Therefore, he asked them to maintain their independence so as not to give the impression of being too closely tied to Egypt (Belhoussein, 2004, p. 163). However, he also emphasized the importance of preserving Egyptian support, particularly in the field of media (Saleh, 2004, p. 109), as well as acknowledging Egypt's diplomatic and media role in promoting the Algerian cause—especially since the *Declaration of November 1st* had been broadcast from *Radio Cairo*.

Ben Bella's response was swift: he sent a reply to the Coordination and Execution Committee outlining his objections in three main points:

1. The non-representative nature of the Conference, since the *Aurès Organization*, the *Oran Organization*, and the *external delegation* had been excluded.
2. The presence of former party members within the leadership structures.

3. The absence of an Islamic character in the political institutions (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 159), which Ben Bella rejected.

From this, it becomes clear that Ben Bella's position was rather hasty. The non-participation of the *Aurès* and *Nememcha* regions was due to the blockade imposed by the colonial administration, while *Oran* was in fact represented by *Larbi Ben M'hidi*. As for the external delegation, it did not attend because it had been appointed only a month before the Conference was held.

This is consistent with what *Mohamed Harbi* stated, noting that *Abane Ramdane* had provided the external delegation with a way to join and attend the Conference (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, p. 154).

This indicates that the external delegation ultimately rejected the legitimacy of the Coordination and Execution Committee, particularly since *Abane Ramdane*, with his strong political influence, was the leading figure at that time.

As for *Ait Ahmed's* position regarding the Coordination and Execution Committee, he supported it, as he was unaware of the Conference having taken place since he was in the United States of America at the time. He was summoned to Madrid to discuss logistical matters that were believed to have been resolved. However, the only point on which he disagreed with this committee was *Abane Ramdane's* appointment of *Amin Dabbaghine* as head of the external delegation in 1955 (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 160), a decision that was rejected by the members of the external delegation in Cairo.

As for *Mohamed Khider*, he remained reserved. According to *Mohamed Harbi*, Khider did not move beyond this reserve except for a letter from *Ouamrane* to the external delegation, criticizing them for surrendering to the police and not using the weapons they had in their possession when their plane landed at the airport (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 160).

Regarding the issue of the hijacking of the plane carrying the five leaders — Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Rabah Bitat — France, unknowingly, rendered a great service to the Revolution on October 22, 1956, it prevented an inevitable clash between the internal leadership of the Revolution and the external delegation. Thus, without realizing it, France offered a significant service to the Revolution, as it halted what would have certainly been internal disintegration among the revolutionaries (Lounissi, 2004, p. 28).

The leaders of the external delegation were not the only ones who rejected the decisions of the Soumam Conference and the policy of the Coordination and Execution Committee. *Mohand ou el-Hadj Mahsas*, who had been appointed by *Ben Bella* as the official in charge of the Tunisian region, also opposed them. The Conference had sent *Amar Ben Aouda* and *Ibrahim Mazhoudi* to Tunisia to study the situation of the Revolution there and to address the issue of weapons. However, Mahsas not only refused this mission but also worked to prevent the regions of *Souk Ahras*, *Aurès*, and *Nememcha* from recognizing the Conference and, consequently, the policy of the Coordination and Execution Committee. As a result, the flow of weapons was halted, leading to conflicts among Algerians along the Tunisian border.

These tensions had a negative impact on the National Liberation Front (FLN). However, the Tunisian authorities managed to control the situation to some extent. The reaction of the revolutionary representatives abroad, particularly in Cairo and Tunis, was one of frustration. They sent an official letter to the Coordination and Execution Committee and to the Provisional Government, and ultimately, they dispatched *Ouamrane* to *Mahsas*, who subsequently fled.

As for the western borders, which were under the command of *Abdelhafid Boussouf* based in *Marrakesh*, he worked to avoid any confrontation with the *Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE)* in order to prevent its intervention (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 159). From this, we can observe that *Abdelhafid Boussouf* was a man of foresight with other ambitions he sought to achieve.

Despite the firm and differing stances regarding the policy of the *CCE*, which emerged from the *Soumam Conference*, *Abane Ramdane*, the principal leader of this committee, stood his ground and faced all these difficulties. The committee played a significant role, both internally and externally, in managing the course of revolutionary events.

However, events took an unexpected turn after the *General Strike* and the subsequent *Battle of Algiers*, when the direction of the revolutionary movement began to shift abroad — a topic that will be addressed in the following section.

The Eight-Day Strike (January 28 – February 3, 1957) and the Departure of the CCE Abroad:

The *Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE)* declared a general strike across the entire national territory (Sari, 2010, p. 40) . As a result, a dangerous situation emerged in Algeria, as it became the center of the strike that lasted from January 28 to February 3, 1957, with the following objectives:

- To destroy the myth of “French Algeria.”
- To gain international support at the United Nations.
- To demonstrate to the world that the Algerian people were united under the banner of the *National Liberation Front (FLN)* (Sari, 2010, p. 60).
- To show hesitant countries the reality of the Algerian problem.
- To push France toward recognizing Algeria’s independence, thereby opening the way for negotiations (Sari, 2010, p. 42).

The strike gained worldwide attention, but this also provoked a brutal French repressive policy aimed at breaking the strikers and sabotaging the movement. It was at this point that what became known in Algerian history as the *Battle of Algiers* emerged, marking the beginning of urban warfare under the leadership of *Larbi Ben M'hidi* (Taguia, 1976, p. 59). This guerrilla activity was organized by the *CCE* (Tripur, 1972, p. 128).

As the French tightened their grip, *Ben M'hidi* was captured. Consequently, the committee was forced to move abroad and dismantle its internal networks. Initially, members took refuge in the mountains for a short period before *Abane Ramdane* and *Saad Dahlab* moved to Morocco, and *Krim Belkacem* and *Benyoucef Benkhedda* went to Tunisia on the same day, May 13, 1957 (Tripur, 1972, p. 128).

In the midst of this separation from the internal front—which gave colonial authorities a strong incentive to intensify their repression of the people—various reactions and opinions emerged regarding the CCE’s decision to leave the country, as it left a significant void and placed the responsibility of leading the internal struggle on the heads of the *wilayas* (military regions).

Reasons for the CCE’s Departure Abroad:

According to *Mohamed Taqia*, the CCE should have remained inside the country, since the Revolution needed leadership from within. Moreover, he argued that the decision to leave was hasty and not a collective one made by the *FLN*. Given the vastness of the country and its geographical nature (Maadad, 1992, p. 81).—comprising mountains and rural areas—the committee should have stayed, entrenched itself there, and continued the struggle until independence

Mohamed’s position was, to some extent, justified, considering that Algeria’s geographical nature required the Committee to operate within its territories. However, exceptional circumstances applied in this case: the colonial authorities had intensified their control, the Committee’s network had been discovered, and it was impossible for them to operate freely, since the interior provinces were experiencing some conflicts that had not yet reached a decisive resolution. These obstacles hindered the dispatch of groups to oppose the decisions of the Soumam Conference and the tasks of the Coordination and Execution Committee.

Mahfoud Benoun, in his testimony, argued that the Coordination and Execution Committee’s actions were contingent on the circumstances surrounding it, which increased the scope of its responsibilities (Bennoune & El-Kenz, 1990, p. 138).

This position reflected his perspective as a military man, and considering that Mahfoud Benoun was stationed on the western borders: “Benoun was correct to some extent, but given that the Coordination and Execution Committee included leaders from the borders, moving the Committee to the Tunisian border would have hindered the work of the border forces.” He added that Abban did not have authority over the borders, as the forces were loyal to their local commanders. (Bennoune & El-Kenz, 1990, p. 138)

Once the members of the Coordination and Execution Committee joined the Committee abroad, i.e., in Tunisia, the Committee convened to assess the stage. During this period, disagreements emerged among its members, especially since Karim Belkacem was committed to the idea of assigning leadership to the historical commanders (Zubayrī, 1999, p. 123), which meant he had abandoned the principles established at the Soumam Conference. This exacerbated the crisis between Karim Belkacem and the first head of the Coordination and Execution Committee, Abban Ramadan.

Moreover, Abban Ramadan was dissatisfied with the situation abroad and requested to return to the interior to reorganize armed operations, but this request was rejected by the military leaders (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, pp. 161-162). Consequently, Abban Ramadan’s influence diminished, and meetings began to be held without him, with new members being added to the Coordination and Execution Committee. This development will be discussed in the following chapter.

The Cairo Conference and the Birth of the Second Coordination and Execution Committee, August 1956

When the Committee of Coordination and Execution left for Tunisia, it held a meeting to assess the situation and evaluate the work it had carried out since the Soumam Conference. It considered it necessary to strengthen organization and coordination in its work, and it mobilized all resources to prepare for holding a conference in Cairo between 20–28 August 1957 (Sheikh, 2003, p. 84).

This conference was preceded by circumstances that helped reinforce and outline a new framework guiding the revolution. Among the most important of these circumstances were:

- The intensification of the revolution inside the country and the increase in French air raids, forcing the population to abandon their lands (Algerian Resistance Newspaper, 1957).
- The imbalance among the leaders of the revolution. This factor was linked to the departure of the Committee of Coordination and Execution to Tunisia, which led to a decline in the influence of Abane Ramdane, who had previously been the main leader of this committee, and the emergence of Krim Belkacem, who adhered to the principle of priority for the historical leaders, along with the growing influence of military figures over political ones.
- The revolution's need for weapons, especially with the tightening grip on the borders, which were considered the only passage for this purpose.
- The revolution's need for funding weapons (Sheikh, 2003, p. 84), especially after the tightening repression against the population and the emergence of commando operations inside cities.

This conference resulted in decisions that had been prepared in advance during the meeting in Tunisia. The conference agenda included two main points:

1. Expanding the National Council of the Revolution from 34 members to 54 members.
2. Expanding the members of the Committee of Coordination and Execution by adding military.

2. The Establishment of the Second Committee of Coordination and Execution – August 1957

The members of the Committee of Coordination and Execution were expanded from five members in the first committee to nine members in the second committee.

Firstly, the military wing came to dominate this committee, represented by Krim Belkacem (Wilaya III – Kabylie region), Lakhdar Ben Tobbal (Wilaya II – North Constantine region), Abdelhafid Boussouf (Wilaya V – Oran region), Mohamed Cherif Messaadia (Wilaya I – Aurès–Nememcha region), and Amar Ouamrane (Wilaya IV – Algiers region). As a result, Benyoucef Benkhedda and Saad Dahlab were removed, after the major role they had played in managing the first committee. From our reading, this can be explained by the fact that Benkhedda and Dahlab were close to Abane Ramdane through their work in the first committee, while Krim Belkacem considered himself marginalized within the political leadership structure. Furthermore, Farhat Abbas, Abdelhamid Mehri, and Amine Debaghine were added, in addition to Abane Ramdane, and they represented the political members (Sheikh, 2003, p. 84).

Moreover, this development can be explained by the growing importance of the military over the political sphere and the priority of the external leadership over the internal one. As a result, the

National Council was freed from all authority, as it was transformed into a body that merely registered decisions taken from abroad, with authority based on the wilayas (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 170). Consequently, the influence of the military increased and their power was strengthened.

In addition, we also notice the inclusion in the committee of members who were not part of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), such as Farhat Abbas and Mohamed Cherif, who were members of the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto. Therefore, this shows that the National Liberation Front opened its doors to members from different political formations in order to preserve the cohesion and unity of the people and to close the gaps that the enemy could have exploited to its advantage. Indeed, the enemy worked tirelessly to create opposing forces serving its interests (Zubayrī, 1999, p. 136), aiming to undermine the work of the National Liberation Front and consequently eliminate the glorious revolution.

The strategy of the Second Committee of Coordination and Execution changed, as all authority was transferred to the military leaders, who outweighed the influence of Abane Ramdane, after he had been the main leader of the First Committee of Coordination and Execution.

The work of the Committee of Coordination and Execution was divided by assigning Ben Tobbal to internal affairs, Abdelhafid Boussouf to communications and correspondence, while Krim Belkacem was assigned to the armed forces. Ouamrane was put in charge of armament and supply, Mahmoud Cherif of financial affairs, whereas social and cultural affairs were entrusted to Abdelhamid Mehri, foreign affairs to Amine Debaghine, and information to Farhat Abbas (Sheikh, 2003, p. 85).

This distribution of responsibilities was based on each member's capabilities and experience in those fields. For example, Abdelhafid Boussouf had specialized in communications within the revolution since its early stages, while Krim Belkacem had excellent experience in the field of armament.

As for the diplomatic field, the Committee of Coordination and Execution worked to establish good relations with neighboring countries, particularly Morocco and Tunisia, especially after the emergence of rear bases along their borders. It called on both countries to unite in opposing any French aggression (Algerian Resistance Newspaper, 1957). The committee also entrusted Tunisia and Morocco with defending the Algerian cause on behalf of the Arab states, in order to clarify the reality of the Algerian issue. On the other hand, it called on Afro-Asian countries to support the same objective.

Political Disputes Among Committee Members and the Assassination of Abban Ramadan

After the members of the Coordination and Execution Committee went abroad, sharp conflicts emerged among them. In the second formation of the committee, new members were added, most of whom had a military background. Consequently, Abban Ramadan's influence declined, giving rise to what became known as the conflict between politicians and military figures within the Coordination and Execution Committee. The military members attempted to assert their control over the committee, which ultimately led to the assassination of Abban Ramadan. This section will address these events in detail, analyzing them and providing interpretations based on relevant sources and references.

There are multiple perspectives regarding the background and motives behind the assassination of Abban Ramadan. The prevailing view is that the military faction eliminated him when he attempted to maintain authority by defending the primacy of political leadership over the military (Lounissi, n.d, p. 20). Since his assassination, power has been concentrated in the hands of the military.

The newspaper El Moudjahid, in its issue of 29 May 1958, reported an incident involving his clash with enemy soldiers, during which he sustained minor injuries. However, on the 15th day of April, his death was announced (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, pp. 151-152). This indicates that considerable ambiguity surrounded this case, especially since Abban Ramadan was responsible for this newspaper.

According to Mohamed Lebjaoui, he collected a number of narratives and testimonies regarding this case through his research into the deep causes that shaped the crisis between the leaders of the Revolution abroad (in Tunisia), which led to the assassination of Abban Ramadan. The latter had requested to return to the homeland to organize the armed struggle from within, but this request was rejected by the military leaders within the Coordination and Execution Committee. In response, Abban Ramadan reportedly issued threats to them and attempted to transfer the crisis to the popular base, leaving it to decide on the matter (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, p. 153). His insistence on his position led to a plot being arranged to eliminate him.

The beginning of this plan involved summoning Abban Ramadan to Morocco under the pretext of resolving problems caused by Moroccan authorities to the Mujahideen there. The trap was set for him, and he was assassinated (Bejaoui, 1990, pp. 152-153). This raises questions about the position of the political members regarding this issue. Meetings of the committee were held in Tunisia without Abban Ramadan's presence, which increased suspicion among the political members (Ferhat Abbas, Abdelhamid Mehri, and Amine Debaghine) within the Coordination and Execution Committee. They demanded his presence and refused to issue or sign any decisions in his absence. As the crisis intensified, the committee ceased its activities, and the "Three Bs" (Mahmoud Cherif, Ben Tobbal, Krim Belkacem, and Abdelhafid Boussouf) were informed of his death in Algiers. (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, p. 161).

This further deepened divisions among committee members, leading Ferhat Abbas to consider resignation, although he later withdrew this decision for the sake of the nation and the Revolution.

3. The Role of the Committee Internally and Externally in Guiding the Course of the Revolution (1958)

Considering that this committee did not last long, it is nevertheless impossible to overlook the role it played in the diplomatic, political, and military spheres in favor of the Revolution.

In the military field, the Coordination and Execution Committee established two military operational commands (COM). The Eastern Command, based in Ghardimaou, was under the supervision of Colonel Hamdi Said and coordinated between Wilaya I, II, and III. The Western Command, based in Oujda, was under Colonel Boumediene and supervised the Wilaya of Oran, the Algiers region, and the South (Sheikh, 2003, p. 85).

In September 1958, the committee put an end to this experiment and punished its members on charges of incompetence (Harbi & Glibert, 2004, p. 182), taking hostile measures against its leaders. This ultimately led to what became known as the Lamouri conspiracy, against which the Coordination and Execution Committee played a major role in ensuring its failure.

This was internally; however, the committee's role externally should not be underestimated despite its short duration.

Since the discovery of petroleum in the Algerian Sahara in 1956, France had strengthened its presence in Algeria and used all possible means to maintain control over the Sahara. France exploited neighboring Tunisia to extend petroleum pipelines through its territory. Regarding this issue, the reaction of the Coordination and Execution Committee was strong. One of its first actions was sending a memorandum to the Tunisian government, as well as to the Moroccan and Libyan governments, on 23 June 1958 (ELmoudjahid, 1958, p. 2), explaining the seriousness of the situation for Algeria in particular and for the Maghreb countries in general. It also clarified that this event could support France in continuing its war in Algeria and could cause significant losses to the Algerian people due to the involvement of foreign investors.

As a result, the obstruction of negotiations between France and Tunisia drew the intervention of the Coordination and Execution Committee.

On French territory, the committee undertook the operation of attacking oil depots on the night of 3 August 1958 (ELmoudjahid, 1958, p. 9) to achieve the following objectives:

1. Sabotage the fuel reserves used by the enemy to supply its military aircraft.
2. Expand the scope of the war and strike France on its own soil.
3. Contribute to strengthening the campaign launched by the National Liberation Front to boycott conscription.
4. Influence French public opinion by showing that the Algerian struggle had a strategic dimension through targeting the French economy, while not targeting civilian populations. In doing so, the Coordination and Execution Committee called on the French people to abandon their indifferent stance toward the war in Algeria (ELmoudjahid, 1958).

This operation was considered a severe blow to France, as the National Liberation Front had struck it at the heart of its territory and at one of the most important pillars of its national economy. The operation was officially announced in a statement by the Coordination and Execution Committee, which claimed responsibility for it (ELmoudjahid, 1958, p. 2). Due to the magnitude of the event, it was accompanied by the November 1st agitation campaign, in order to give it a media dimension whose impact would reach the international community.

In the diplomatic field, and in implementation of the decisions of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, the committee designated 20 March 1958 as a global day of solidarity with the Algerian people. African and Asian countries participated in it, and this day demonstrated to the colonial power that the revolution was supported by Arab brothers as well as the peoples of Asia and Africa (Ouzghedi, 1989, p. 22). Thus, the Algerian cause gained strong support, adding to the efforts made by Afro-Asian countries to seek a solution to the Algerian question and to end colonial rule.

In addition, the Coordination and Execution Committee took positions regarding global events, such as the French bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef on 8 February 1958, which resulted in civilian casualties. The French authorities carried out this attack under the pretext of targeting National Liberation Army units inside Tunisian territory (Ayeb, 2005, p. 276), which were conducting operations to breach the electrified barriers located along the Tunisian border.

Consequently, the Coordination and Execution Committee sent a telegram signed by Boussouf, Krim Belkacem, and Amine Debaghine to the Tunisian authorities, expressing its regret over the despicable act committed by colonial forces (ELmoudjahid, 1958) against unarmed civilians. This act was considered a violation of human dignity and was not unprecedented, as its objective was to undermine Tunisian support for the Algerian Revolution.

The Third Coordination and Execution Committee and the Emergence of the Provisional Government, 1958

1. The Birth of the Third Coordination and Execution Committee – April 1958:

After the death of Abban Ramadan in December 1957, the Coordination and Execution Committee did not resume its activities until April 1958 (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 180). This followed attempts to overcome internal disagreements among its members and reaffirm the primary goal: continuing the revolution to achieve independence. A decisive session was convened, prepared by Krim Belkacem, with a new orientation that will be clarified in the following section.

2. Meeting of the Third Coordination and Execution Committee – April 1958 and Its Outcomes:

The first meeting of the Third Coordination and Execution Committee focused on two main issues: the first concerned the harassment faced by the National Liberation Army during its crossing of the borders, whether Tunisian or Moroccan, and the second related to the distribution of tasks among committee members (Hashmaoui, 2010, p. 136).

Eight directorates were created, each assigned specific responsibilities, which can be summarized as follows:

First: The Directorate of War, entrusted to Krim Belkacem, who assumed overall command, internal coordination, and guidance, as well as responsibilities regarding armament and logistics (Harbi M. , 1983, p. 195).

Second: The Directorate of Armament and Supply, which included four main tasks:

- a) Managing supplies and weapons.
- b) Directing the army and its movement to the borders.
- c) Monitoring all technical and commercial reports, a responsibility assigned to Omar Amar.

Third: The Directorate of Communications and General Coordination, entrusted to Abdelhafid Boussouf due to his extensive experience in the field. This directorate oversaw the establishment and monitoring of communication channels and the management of communications transformations, as well as monitoring enemy movements.

Fourth: The Directorate of Foreign Affairs, assigned to Amine Debaghine, covering Algeria's relations with countries around the world, including North Africa, Arab nations, Afro-Asian countries, as well as European and American states.

Fifth: The Directorate of Finance, headed by Mahmoud Cherif. This directorate was responsible for managing and monitoring the revolutionary budget and assessing all available material resources through submitted reports.

Sixth: The Directorate of Administration and Organization, responsible for organizing the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Morocco, Tunisia, and even in France. These tasks were assigned to Ben Tobbal.

Seventh: The Directorate of Social and Cultural Affairs, headed by Abdelhamid Mehri, focused on refugee issues, the Red Crescent, unions, and students. Additionally, Abdelhamid Mehri was entrusted with communication with Morocco and Tunisia. This culminated in the Tangier meeting between the three parties (Hashmaoui, 2010, p. 138) from April 27–30, 1958, initiated by the Independence Party, aiming to work toward unifying the Maghreb. For Algeria, it emphasized the necessity of establishing a Provisional Government (National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1, n.d., p. 92) and recognized the FLN as the representative of the Algerian people.

Eighth: The Directorate of Press and Media, headed by Ferhat Abbas, focused on promoting the revolution both domestically and internationally. The task distribution within this committee reflected each member's specialization; for example, Abdelhafid Boussouf, known as "the father of Algerian intelligence," had extensive knowledge of all intelligence matters.

The establishment of the First Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

Based on reports submitted by members of the Coordination and Execution Committee, discussions were held on the necessity of establishing a Provisional Government, as the committee had become unable to manage the prevailing circumstances.

The National Council of the Revolution convened its second session in Cairo in August 1958, which was announced by the committee to take place on September 19, 1958 (Bejaoui, 1990, p. 132), presided over by Ferhat Abbas. The council assumed the full powers of a regular government (Bejaoui, 1990, p. 133), studying issues, issuing charters, appointing positions, and assigning tasks to revolutionary leaders.

The Provisional Government was recognized by many countries, beginning with Saudi Arabia. Despite its announcement, a delegation from the Coordination and Execution Committee went to Morocco to secure official recognition from King Mohammed V, who ultimately supported this government³. This shows that the committee maintained its functions until the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was politically established and appeared as a fully functioning government (The Echo of Oran, 1958, p. 2).

Fourth: Challenges Faced by the Committee During the Fifth Year of the Revolution

After examining the dire situation of the revolution, which raised concerns among the committee members, reports were submitted on the revolution's political, military, and diplomatic

conditions¹. Members were called to seek urgent solutions to prevent disastrous outcomes, including the establishment of a Provisional Government for the Algerian Republic.

Omar Amar highlighted issues related to armament, logistics, and the severe repression by the French, advocating for the creation of a Provisional Government and rejecting foreign interference in internal matters. He also emphasized striking France at its core², a correct approach as it aimed to challenge France in international forums.

Ferhat Abbas, in his report, called for improving the situation of the people and the army so the revolution could continue its struggle and make its voice heard internationally, particularly in relations with Western countries³.

Krim Belkacem emphasized the dangers along the “Maurice Line,” calling for popular solidarity and external support to weaken France’s power. He also noted the upheaval in African states due to emerging liberation movements⁴, advocating for connections with these countries to unite with the revolution under a single strategic plan.

By addressing these challenges and leveraging support in Africa and France, the committee sought solidarity with the Algerian people⁵. This was considered the only path to victory, especially given the circumstances, including the neighboring countries’ conspiracies in favor of France. The conclusion drawn was that the Coordination and Execution Committee had become outdated and that the revolution required a strong, centralized authority to face France, especially in international forums, hence the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

Bibliography

(1958, 7 1958). *ELmoudjahid*(27), p. 2.

(1958, 09 17). *ELmoudjahid*(29), p. 09.

(1958, 2 15). *ELmoudjahid*(18).

(1958, September 19). *The Echo of Oran*(31), p. 2.

Algerian Resistance Newspaper. (1957, November 1). (19).

Ayeb, M. (2005). *he Sakiet Sidi Youssef Incident, February 1958: The Beginning of American Interest in the Maghreb Region. Annals of the Historian*(3-4).

Bejaoui, M. (1990). *The Truth About the Algerian Revolution. Algiers: A.N.E.P. Editions.*

Belhoussein, M. (2004). *Correspondence Between the Interior and Exterior (Algeria–Cairo), 1954–1962. Algiers: Casbah Publishing.*

Bennoune, M., & El-Kenz, A. (1990). *Chance and History: Interviews with Belaid Abdessalam (1st ed., Vol. 1). Algiers: ENAG.*

Harbi, M. (1983). *Algeria: The National Liberation Front Between Reality and Myth, 1954–1962 (1st ed.). Beirut, Lebanon: Arab Research Foundation.*

Harbi, M. (1983). *The Archives of the Algerian Revolution. Paris: Jeune Afrique.*

Harbi, M., & Glibert, M. (2004). *The FLN: Documents and History, 1954-1962. Paris: Fayard.*

Hashmaoui, M. (2010). *The Roots of the November 1954 Revolution in Algeria. Algeria: Dar Houma.*

- Lounissi, R. (2004, July–December). *The Internal Conflicts of the Algerian Revolution in Algerian Historical Discourse. Insaniyat(Double Issue No. 28)*.
- Lounissi, R. (n.d). *Algeria in a State of Conflict Between the Military and Politicians. Algiers: Dar Al-Ma'rifa*.
- Maadad, M. (1992). *Algerian War: Chronology and Commentary (1st ed.)*. Algeria: ENAG. National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1, 1. R. (n.d.). *Series of Diplomacy Seminars 1930–1962: Studies and Research from the First National Meeting on the Development of Diplomacy. First National Meeting on the Development of Diplomacy. National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1, 1954 Revolution*.
- Ouzghedi, L. (1989). *The Soumam Conference and the Development of the National Liberation Revolution 1956–1962*. Algeria: National Book Institution.
- Saleh, L. (2004). *The Algerian Revolution in the Arab Media: Egypt as a Model*. Masader(10), National Center for Studies and Research in the National Movement and the November 1, 1954 Revolution.
- Sari, D. (2010). *Eight Days of the Battle (1st ed.)*. Algiers: E N A G.
- Sheikh, S. (2003). *Algeria Takes up Arms or the Era of Certainty: An Analytical Study on the History of the National Movement and the Armed Revolution*. (M. H. Eljamali, Ed.) Beirut: Dar Al-Masrya Al-Lubnaniya.
- Taguia, M. (1976). *Algeria at War (1st ed.)*. Algiers: OPUA.
- Tripur, P. (1972). *Autopsy of the Algerian War (1st ed.)*. Paris: France Empire.
- Zubayrī, M. (1999). *History of Contemporary Algeria: A Study (Vol. 2)*. Damascus: Union of Arab Writers.